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Chapter 12
The Work-School Trade-Off among 
Children in West Africa: 
Are Household Tasks More Compatible 
with School Than Economic Activities?
Philippe De Vreyer, Flore Gubert, and Nelly Rakoto-Tiana
Th eoretical and empirical studies of time allocation decisions for children in 
developing countries point to a number of determinants of the demand for 
education and the supply of child labor. Th ese studies can be grouped into two 
main schools of thought. Th e fi rst is in the vein of the theory of the demand 
for education, introduced by Becker (1964). Becker posited that parents’ deci-
sions about whether to send their children to school are the result of a trade-off  
between the expected returns to and the cost of education. Th is cost includes 
school-related monetary expenditures and the opportunity cost of forgone 
wages or other remuneration. If the returns to education are too low com-
pared with its cost, parents will choose not to send the children to school and 
will have them work instead. Child labor can also be considered as the best 
option when specifi c know-how and skills learned on the job are more profi t-
able than education (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985; De Vreyer, Lambert, and 
Magnac 1999). 
Th e second school of thought focuses on the impact of various constraints 
aff ecting the supply of child labor, the demand for education, or both. A fi rst 
set of constraints stems from imperfections in the markets for labor and land 
(Bhalotra and Heady 2003). When a household does not have enough labor to 
work all the land it owns, it has two options: hire external labor (farm work-
ers) or rent out or sharecrop part of its land. If external labor is not available—
because of labor market imperfections (frequent in rural areas) or a weak or 
nonexistent land market—the household may put its children to work. Any 
factor that raises the opportunity cost of children’s time tends to increase their 
labor participation and reduce their attendance at school. Poverty-related 
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constraints (Basu and Van 1998) and credit market imperfections (Jacoby and 
Skoufi as 1997; Ranjan 1999; Baland and Robinson 2000; Skoufi as and Parker 
2002) may also explain the emergence of child labor and the concomitant 
 fall-off  in school attendance.
Many empirical studies set out to identify the factors involved in the work-
school trade-off . Many are based on the joint estimation of school attendance 
and labor participation equations using bivariate or sequential probit models. 
Th e defi nition of child labor diff ers somewhat across studies. Some studies—
including research by the International Labour Organization (ILO)—defi ne 
child labor as “any economic activity conducted by a child”; children whose only 
work is performing household tasks within the family sphere are considered 
economically inactive.1 Other studies adopt a broader defi nition, considering 
participation in household tasks to be a form of child labor. Although this more 
inclusive defi nition may seem preferable, grouping domestic and economic 
activities in the same category amounts to making the strong implicit assump-
tion that the same factors determine both. Analysis of the factors involved in the 
work-school trade-off  would probably be enriched if domestic and economic 
activities were considered as two distinct alternatives.
On the basis of this principle, we conduct a joint analysis of the determi-
nants of school and work among children 10–14, separating out activities con-
ducted in the household from economic activities. Using the approach adopted 
by Kis-Katos (2012), we estimate a trivariate probit model using simulated 
maximum likelihood in which participation in school, household tasks, and 
economic activities is explained by a vector of variables including the child’s 
characteristics (age, gender, relationship to household head, birth rank, reli-
gion, and so forth) and the characteristics of the child’s household (wealth, size, 
composition, activities, and so forth). Th e data used are drawn from Phase 1 of 
the 1-2-3 surveys conducted simultaneously in seven West African cities (for a 
description of these surveys, see box O.1 in the overview). 
Th e fi ndings show that the determinants of participation in the two types 
of activity are signifi cantly diff erent. For example, having a household head 
who is a self-employed entrepreneur increases the participation of children in 
economic activities in fi ve of the seven cities (all except Bamako and Ouaga-
dougou) but has no eff ect on their participation in domestic activities. Boys 
participate considerably less in domestic activities than girls, but they have a 
greater probability than girls of participating in economic activities in two of the 
seven cities (Dakar and Niamey). Th ere seems to be much more competition 
in the allocation of time between economic activity and school than between 
domestic activity and school.
Th is chapter is structured as follows. Th e fi rst section presents descriptive 
statistics drawn from the 1-2-3 survey data on schooling and child labor. Th e 
second section presents the empirical strategy for modeling the work-school 
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trade-off . Th e third section presents and comments on the results of the estima-
tions. Th e last section summarizes the main conclusions and draws some policy 
implications.
Work and School among Children in West Africa
Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys is an employment survey providing detailed 
information on economic and domestic activities (taking care of children, the 
elderly, and infi rm; fetching water and wood; and so forth) of all individuals 10 
and older. Th e following discussion concentrates on children 10–14.2
Table 12.1, which presents the work participation and school enrollment 
rates in each city, reveals wide disparities across cities. Th e percentage of 
Table 12.1 Work Participation and School Enrollment Rates for Children 10–14 in Seven 
Cities in West Africa, by Gender, 2001/02
(percent)
City
Performs 
domestic 
activities
Performs 
economic 
activities
Performs domestic 
or economic 
activities
Attends 
school Inactive
Number of 
(weighted) 
observations
Abidjan
Girls 51.6 20.2 58.0 57.5 5.7 177,888
Boys 17.6 8.9 24.3 80.7 7.7 142,312
All 36.5 15.2 43.0 67.8 6.6 320,200
Bamako
Girls 51.8 11.5 54.8 71.9 9.0 74,237
Boys 14.6 9.8 22.6 81.3 12.6 73,964
All 33.2 10.7 38.7 76.6 10.8 148,202
Cotonou
Girls 77.6 19.4 79.3 67.4 1.4 53,254
Boys 61.3 8.0 65.4 87.7 2.5 49,440
All 69.8 13.9 72.6 77.2 1.9 102,694
Dakar
Girls 58.8 6.8 61.7 65.9 7.9 124,088
Boys 19.5 10.8 27.9 72.5 15.3 117,458
All 39.7 8.7 45.3 69.1 11.5 241,546
Lomé
Girls 92.0 22.0 92.1 77.7 0.5 48,467
Boys 77.5 9.6 78.6 94.4 0.5 42,780
All 85.2 16.2 85.8 85.5 0.5 91,247
(continued next page)
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Niamey
Girls 64.4 10.3 66.3 71.3 5.5 45,831
Boys 23.8 14.3 32.5 74.4 13.3 40,660
All 45.3 12.1 50.4 72.8 9.2 86,491
Ouagadougou
Girls 60.6 9.0 63.5 74.1 4.8 58,187
Boys 21.0 6.8 26.2 85.0 8.4 54,889
All 41.4 7.9 45.4 79.4 6.5 113,076
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique 
Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics 
institutes.
Note: Sample weights were used to obtain representative results for the underlying population. Percentages 
sum to more than 100 percent because children may both engage in economic or domestic activities and 
attend school.
Table 12.1 (continued)
City
Performs 
domestic 
activities
Performs 
economic 
activities
Performs domestic 
or economic 
activities
Attends 
school Inactive
Number of 
(weighted) 
observations
children 10–14 attending school is higher in Lomé (86 percent), Ouagadou-
gou (79 percent), and Cotonou (77 percent) than in the richer cities of Abi-
djan (68 percent) and Dakar (69 percent). In Abidjan, this situation refl ects 
discrimination against girls: the Gender Parity Index (GPI) (the ratio of girls’ 
enrollment to boys’ enrollment) is 71 percent in Abidjan and more than 
85 percent in the other cities (except Cotonou, where it is 77 percent). 
Lomé and Cotonou also have the highest rates of children 10–14 working 
and attending school (72 percent in Lomé, 52 percent in Cotonou) (table 12.2). 
Th ese fi gures are much higher than in Niamey (32 percent), Ouagadougou 
(31 percent), Bamako and Dakar (26 percent), and Abidjan (17 percent). Th e 
rate of participation in domestic activities varies widely across cities. In contrast, 
participation in economic activities is low in all seven cities (9–16 percent). 
Girls participate much more than boys in domestic and economic activities and 
attend school less than their male counterparts.
Table 12.3 provides information on the average number of hours worked by 
working children per week. Not surprisingly, children who work without going 
to school work longer hours on average than children who combine work and 
school. However, the observed diff erences are much larger for the number of 
hours spent on economic activities, suggesting that it is possible to combine 
domestic activities and school, at least up to a certain point. Th e number of 
hours spent on domestic activities is higher among girls not attending school 
than for girls attending school (this result does not hold for boys), Table 12.3 
also reveals that whether or not they are enrolled in school, girls spend much 
more time than boys on domestic activities.
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Table 12.2 Work-School Trade-Off for Children 10–14 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Gender, 2001/02
City
Working 
only
Attending 
school only
Working and 
attending school Inactive
Number of (weighted) 
observations
Abidjan
Girls 36.8 36.4 21.2 5.7 177,888
Boys 11.6 68.0 12.7 7.7 142,312
All 25.6 50.4 17.4 6.6 320,200
Bamako
Girls 19.1 36.2 35.7 9.0 74,237
Boys 6.1 64.8 16.5 12.6 73,964
All 12.6 50.5 26.1 10.8 148,202
Cotonou
Girls 31.2 19.3 48.1 1.4 53,254
Boys 9.9 32.2 55.5 2.5 49,440
All 20.9 25.5 51.7 1.9 102,694
Dakar
Girls 26.2 30.4 35.5 7.9 124,088
Boys 12.2 56.8 15.7 15.3 117,458
All 19.4 43.2 25.9 11.5 241,546
Lomé
Girls 21.8 7.3 70.4 0.5 48,467
Boys 5.1 20.9 73.5 0.5 42,780
All 14.0 13.7 71.8 0.5 91,247
Niamey
Girls 23.2 28.2 43.1 5.5 45,831
Boys 12.3 54.2 20.2 13.3 40,660
All 18.1 40.4 32.4 9.2 86,491
Ouagadougou
Girls 21.2 31.7 42.3 4.8 58,187
Boys 6.7 65.5 19.5 8.4 54,889
All 14.1 48.1 31.3 6.5 113,076
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 12.1 for details).
Tables 12.4 and 12.5 show the nature of the work children perform and the 
type of remuneration they receive. Table 12.4 displays a wide range of activities 
across cities. Family worker status is dominant in six of the seven cities.3 Wide 
gender diff erences are apparent. Family worker is the dominant category for 
girls in all cities. Among boys, family worker is the dominant category only 
in Lomé and Niamey. In the other cities, more than 70 percent of boys who 
work are apprentices in Abidjan, Cotonou, and Dakar, and about 50 percent are 
apprentices in Bamako and Ouagadougou. 
354  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Table 12.3 Average Weekly Hours Worked by Children 10–14 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Gender, 2001/02
Children who work 
and attend school
Children who work and 
do not attend school All children who work
City
Time 
spent on 
economic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
domestic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
economic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
domestic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
economic 
activities
Time 
spent on 
domestic 
activities
Abidjan
Girls 1.9 6.8 24.3 17.2 16.1 13.4
Boys 1.5 4.7 38.6 3.1 19.2 3.9
All 1.7 6.1 27.2 14.4 16.9 11.0
Bamako
Girls 5.4 17.4 14.4 22.0 8.5 19.0
Boys 13.1 9.2 36.4 7.3 19.4 8.6
All 7.8 14.8 19.8 18.4 11.7 16.0
Cotonou
Girls 0.4 11.0 28.0 22.0 11.3 15.3
Boys 0.2 8.8 42.8 6.9 6.6 8.5
All 0.3 9.8 31.4 18.6 9.3 12.4
Dakar
Girls 1.5 15.0 8.4 19.9 4.4 17.1
Boys 5.5 8.0 33.4 5.2 17.7 6.8
All 2.7 12.9 16.0 15.4 8.4 14.0
Lomé
Girls 5.0 18.3 29.9 27.1 10.9 20.4
Boys 3.2 11.6 27.7 14.5 4.7 11.8
All 4.1 15.1 29.5 25.0 8.3 16.7
Niamey
Girls 2.8 16.7 9.7 21.0 5.2 18.2
Boys 12.8 10.2 28.6 8.4 18.7 9.5
All 5.7 14.8 15.7 17.0 9.3 15.6
Ouagadougou
Girls 1.6 15.6 17.1 24.9 6.7 18.7
Boys 3.8 8.0 37.8 4.2 12.4 7.0
All 2.2 13.3 21.8 20.1 8.3 15.4
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 12.1 for details).
Gender diff erences are also apparent in the breakdown between unskilled 
and apprentice activities. Except in Lomé, girls have a much lower probability of 
being apprentices and are much more likely to be unskilled workers than boys. 
On the whole, these fi ndings suggest that when girls do not go to school, their 
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Table 12.4 Nature of Work Performed by Children 10–14 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
by Gender, 2001/02
City
Unskilled 
worker Apprentice
Family 
workera Otherb
Number of 
observations
Abidjan
Girls 35.4 7.6 55.4 1.5 34,921
Boys 11.4 73.9 14.7 0.0 12,669
All 29.0 25.3 44.6 1.1 47,590
Bamako
Girls 24.1 2.7 70.2 3.0 8,257
Boys 7.4 48.0 44.7 0.0 7,022
All 16.4 23.5 58.5 1.6 15,279
Cotonou
Girls 22.9 11.3 65.9 0.0 10,332
Boys 4.6 81.1 14.4 0.0 3,928
All 17.8 30.5 51.7 0.0 14,260
Dakar
Girls 35.9 13.9 42.5 7.7 8,352
Boys 7.3 76.4 15.5 0.8 12,675
All 18.7 51.6 26.2 3.6 21,027
Lomé
Girls 11.3 3.9 84.1 0.7 10,710
Boys 30.5 21.2 48.3 0.0 4,123
All 16.7 8.7 74.1 0.5 14,834
Niamey
Girls 12.9 7.8 76.9 2.4 4,656
Boys 6.5 21.7 69.5 2.3 5,763
All 9.4 15.5 72.8 2.3 10,419
Ouagadougou
Girls 18.5 9.4 72.1 0.0 5,194
Boys 9.6 48.3 41.1 1.0 3,738
All 14.8 25.7 59.1 0.4 8,933
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 12.1 for details).
a. Includes mostly servants, maids, and vendors. 
b. Includes mostly servants and maids who report being paid wages in semi-qualified work. 
labor is used to provide the household with income or to perform domestic 
tasks. In contrast, boys continue to accumulate human capital. Th eir appren-
ticeships do not raise the household’s income, but they give boys the skills to 
increase their resources in adulthood. Gender inequality in access to education 
may therefore be coupled with inequality in access to vocational training. Th is 
conclusion is underpinned by the data in table 12.5, which show that girls in all 
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Table 12.5 Type of Remuneration Working Children 10–14 Receive in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
City Fixed wage Daily or hourly pay Piece-rate Commission Proﬁ ts In kind No remuneration No answer given Number of observations
Abidjan
Girls 16.0 4.3 4.3 12.2 13.6 18.1 30.9 0.7 34,921
Boys 2.5 4.9 0.0 7.1 1.5 1.5 82.4 0.0 12,669
All 12.5 4.4 3.2 10.9 10.4 13.8 44.3 0.5 47,590
Bamako
Girls 25.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 39.0 9.1 21.6 4.3 8,257
Boys 0.3 9.8 8.6 1.2 35.6 16.7 25.2 2.6 7,022
All 13.8 4.5 4.4 0.5 37.4 12.6 23.3 3.5 15,279
Cotonou
Girls 15.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.7 11.8 70.7 0.0 10,332
Boys 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 89.4 0.0 3,928
All 11.6 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.3 10.6 75.9 0.0 14,260
Dakar
Girls 44.6 0.0 2.6 4.9 8.9 4.2 31.3 3.5 8,352
Boys 7.1 3.5 10.6 10.9 5.5 2.0 58.9 1.6 12,675
All 22.1 2.1 7.4 8.5 6.9 2.9 47.9 2.3 21,027
Lomé
Girls 13.0 2.2 0.8 1.5 26.0 13.6 42.1 0.7 10,710
Boys 5.1 11.6 16.1 2.1 19.9 8.0 37.4 0.0 4,123
All 10.8 4.9 5.1 1.7 24.3 12.0 40.8 0.5 14,834
Niamey
Girls 16.4 0.0 1.8 0.0 13.5 1.3 63.6 3.4 4,656
Boys 2.3 6.6 18.1 2.2 14.6 2.7 50.8 2.8 5,763
All 8.6 3.6 10.8 1.2 14.1 2.1 56.5 3.1 10,419
Ouagadougou
Girls 21.9 1.1 2.1 0.0 15.8 20.3 38.3 0.4 5,194
Boys 7.4 9.8 11.4 0.0 26.3 17.9 27.2 0.0 3,738
All 15.9 4.7 6.0 0.0 20.1 19.3 33.7 0.2 8,933
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 12.1 for details).
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cities have a greater probability than boys of being paid a fi xed wage; boys have 
a higher probability of receiving no remuneration in four of the seven cities 
(Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, and Dakar).
Modeling the Trade-Off between Work and School 
Becker’s (1964) human capital model considers education as an investment 
made by autonomous individuals on the basis of their preferences and char-
acteristics (time preference, life expectancy, cognitive skills, and so forth) on 
the one hand, and the returns to education on the other. Individuals may be 
more or less constrained in their choices, depending on their capacity to borrow 
and to make a living while investing in education. In each period, individuals 
decide whether they continue to invest in education or enter the labor market 
to get a job based on their qualifi cations. Th e optimal level of investment in 
education is reached when the marginal cost of one additional year of school-
ing equals the marginal return to the additional year of schooling. Th is model 
has been extended to take the trade-off  between education and fertility into 
account (Becker and Lewis 1973), as well as the trade-off  in allocating invest-
ment in human capital among children within a household (Behrman, Pollak, 
and Taubman 1982).
Th is theoretical framework can be used to interpret some of the statistical 
and econometric results on the determinants of the demand for schooling and 
child labor. In this setting, it is assumed that the household head allocates the 
child’s time (excluding leisure). Time may be allocated to schooling, domestic 
tasks, and market work based on the household’s preferences, the immedi-
ate and future returns to each activity, and various constraints the household 
faces. Acquisition of specifi c skills while working may raise future returns 
on the labor market more than skills acquired at school. Parents may thus 
decide not to educate their child or to reduce the time they spend at school 
(De Vreyer, Lambert, and Magnac 1999). Poverty may be one of the constraints 
to schooling, whatever the household’s preferences and the size of the returns 
to education. All these factors are closely intertwined and determine, to vary-
ing degrees, the parents’ decision to send their children to school, make them 
work, or make them participate in domestic tasks. Our empirical strategy deals 
with this interdependence.
We model children’s allocation of time among economic (market) activities, 
domestic activities, and school, considering these choices to be interdependent 
and simultaneous. We do not observe the number of hours spent in each activ-
ity, but we know whether each child participates in each. We estimate a tri-
variate probit model in which three latent variables—participation in economic 
activities, L*; participation in domestic activities, D*; and school attendance, 
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S*—depend on a vector of explanatory variables X; a vector of parameters aL, 
aD, and aS; and error terms eL, eD, and eS, which are jointly normally distributed. 
Formally, we estimate the following system of equations (written for child i):
 
L
1 if Li = XlʹbL + eL > 0
= XlʹbD + eD > 0
= XlʹbS + eS > 0
D
1 if Di
i
*
i
*
=
⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪
=
⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪
S
1 if Si
0 if not
0 if not
0 if not
i
*
=
⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪  (12.1)
where N with
1
1
1
iLε
ε
ε
iD
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LS DS
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟
→ ( ) =
⎛
⎝
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⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ .
Coeffi  cients r jk (with j ≠ k) refl ect the correlation that can exist between the 
errors of the three choice equations. Depending on whether the choices are 
independent or not, these coeffi  cients are zero or signifi cantly diff erent from 
zero. Th is model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using the GHK 
(Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) method (Terracol 2002; Greene 2003). 
Th e vector of variables X includes individual characteristic variables (child’s 
age, gender, migratory status, status in relation to household head, and religion) 
and household characteristic variables (the household head’s gender, the pres-
ence or absence of a spouse, the level of education of the household head and his 
or her spouse, the employment status of the household head, the household size, 
the number of children, and the level of wealth). Child’s age is included to cap-
ture the fact that the probability of being in school between the ages of 10 and 14 
decreases with age, even in countries (such as Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
and Togo) where the age limit for compulsory attendance is higher than 14, the 
probability declines even more in countries where it is lower than 14 (such as 
Benin, Niger, and Senegal) (see note 2). 
Child’s gender is also included among the regressors. As suggested by the 
descriptive statistics, the allocation of time is likely to diff er for girls and boys, 
with girls having lower levels of schooling on average and being more involved 
in domestic and market work (except in Dakar and Niamey). 
Relationship to the household head is measured by a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if the child is the son or daughter of the head (and 0 otherwise). It is 
included to capture the fact that household heads may be more likely to invest in 
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the education of their biological children, either for altruistic reasons or because 
they expect to receive greater support from them in the future. (In the absence 
of well-functioning insurance markets and retirement schemes, education may 
be part of an implicit contractual arrangement between parents and their chil-
dren whereby parents invest in their children’s education in order to receive 
support from their children when they are too old to work.)
Th e child’s migratory status (measured by a dummy taking the value 1 if 
the child originates from a rural area) is included to control for the impact of 
the child’s background on his or her allocation of time. Many children reside 
in households headed by adults who are not their biological parents, even if 
their parents reside in these households (the 1-2-3 surveys do not record such 
detailed information). Children born outside the capital city are likely to be 
foster children.4 Time allocation of these children depends partly on the reasons 
why they are in foster care. 
Variables for the gender and education of the household head and spouse 
are introduced to capture household preferences for sending children to school 
or work. Th e education variable also controls for the fact that highly educated 
adults may off er better learning conditions to children, choose better schools, 
and facilitate their insertion into the labor market. An increase in the level of 
education of the household head and his or her spouse is thus expected to result 
in a decrease in children’s participation in economic activity and an increase in 
their schooling. 
Th e household head’s self-employment status is included to control for the 
opportunity cost of attending school. Because children in households with self-
employed members can be easily employed in the family businesses, they bear 
a higher opportunity cost of attending school, which may negatively aff ect their 
schooling investment and increase their participation in market work. 
Household size and the number of children in the household may also aff ect 
a child’s time allocation. Th e presence of more children in the household may 
negatively aff ect schooling and increase participation in domestic tasks if older 
children take care of younger ones. By contrast, more adults in the household 
may allow a better allocation of tasks and relax the time constraint, which may 
positively aff ect schooling and reduce the likelihood of market work. 
Th e expected sign of the variable measuring household wealth is undeter-
mined a priori. On the one hand, richer households are less likely to be budget 
constrained, which should positively aff ect schooling and reduce child labor. On 
the other hand, richer households are more likely to possess productive assets. 
By increasing the returns to labor, those assets may increase child labor. As we 
control for the head’s self-employment status, this last eff ect should already be 
captured, so that the positive impact of wealth should dominate. 
Household wealth is measured by a composite standard-of-living indicator, 
built using the data on household assets and the characteristics of the dwelling. 
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Th is indicator provides a less cyclical measure of the household standard of 
living than income or per capita consumption. It is built from a principal com-
ponent analysis, which summarizes the information in 16 variables: (ownership 
or nonownership of a car, motorbike, bicycle, radio, television, hi-fi , refrigerator, 
and sewing machine; number of rooms in the dwelling; whether the dwelling is 
a private house; connection of the dwelling to the electricity grid; type of water 
supply (tap or standpipe); and type of toilet (private fl ush lavatory, shared fl ush 
lavatory, or latrine) (table 12.6).
Th e fi rst principal component accounts for 22–30 percent of the total vari-
ance. It is signifi cantly and positively correlated with most of the variables 
Table 12.6 Weights of Variables in the First Principal Component 
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Assets owned
Car (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.26 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.32
Motorbike (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.22
Bicycle (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.03
Radio (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.10
Television (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33
Hi-ﬁ  (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.28
Refrigerator 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 0.25 0.37 0.31 0.20 0.33 0.29 0.32
Sewing machine 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.13
Dwelling characteristics
Number of rooms 0.34 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.15
Connected to the electricity 
grid (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.11 0.32 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.32
Private house (yes = 1; 
no = 0) 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.31 0.31
Connected to running 
water (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.36 0.34
Water access via a 
standpipe (yes = 1; no = 0) –0.35 –0.19 –0.28 –0.37 –0.22 –0.31 –0.32
Private lavatory 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 0.40 0.30 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.31
Shared lavatory 
(yes = 1; no = 0) –0.20 –0.02 –0.20 –0.21 –0.03 –0.01 –0.02
Latrine (yes = 1; no = 0) –0.22 –0.14 –0.03 –0.15 –0.16 –0.04 0.04
Percentage of total inertia 
explained by ﬁ rst 
principal component 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.29
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see box O.1 and table 12.1 for details).
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concerned and can be interpreted as an indicator of the households’ standard 
of living or wealth. 
Some variables (such as child’s migration status and the household wealth 
index) are likely to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity terms that 
aff ect the probability of going to school, performing domestic activities, or 
working. Children that migrated, either on their own or to follow their parents, 
may adopt diff erent behavior with respect to working or going to school not 
because they migrated but because migration was a precondition for them to 
get involved in these activities (an example is children who are being fostered so 
that they can attend school in the capital). Th e wealth index might be positively 
correlated with the probability of going to school without having any causal 
relation to it (if, for instance, the wealthiest households have a higher prefer-
ence for education). Control variables, such as the education of the household 
head and spouse, are included in the list of explanatory variables in order to 
reduce this source of bias, but we cannot guarantee that we eliminated it com-
pletely. Without any credible instrument that would allow the use of two-stage 
least squares to solve the problem, we have no choice but to recognize possible 
sources of bias when commenting on the regression results in the next section. 
Econometric Results
Table 12.7 presents the results of the estimations. Given that the standard 
deviations of the estimated coeffi  cients are potentially biased by error term 
correlations for children from the same household, the error terms have been 
corrected.
Th e residual correlation coeffi  cients indicate that the unobservable vari-
ables have opposite eff ects on school attendance and work (either domestic or 
market work). Th is fi nding suggests that a form of competition exists between 
school and work. Competition between school and economic activity (RLS) 
appears to be much stronger than competition between school and domestic 
activity (RDS). Th e value of the correlation coeffi  cient RDS is low and not sig-
nifi cantly diff erent from zero for four of the seven cities (Bamako, Cotonou, 
Lomé, and Ouagadougou), whereas the value of RLS is signifi cant and high for 
all cities. Th is fi nding is similar to that obtained by Dumas (2004) for Brazil 
and Kis-Katos (2012) for two northern Indian provinces.
For individual characteristics, the results show that older children have a 
lower probability of going to school and a higher probability of participating 
in both market activities and domestic tasks. Th is result is robust to the sample 
and the specifi cation. In many cities, boys have a higher probability of going 
to school than girls and a systematically lower probability of participating in 
household tasks. Th e fi ndings on participation in economic activities are more 
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Table 12.7 Results of Trivariate Probit Model of Allocation of Time of Children 10–14 in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02 
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Attends school
Age –0.131** –0.0685** –0.183** –0.126** –0.0926* –0.141** –0.165**
(0.0309) (0.0262) (0.0324) (0.0208) (0.0377) (0.0245) (0.0267)
Boy (dummy) 0.670** 0.206* 0.215 0.188* 0.779** 0.0227 –0.0186
(0.191) (0.101) (0.158) (0.0770) (0.195) (0.0822) (0.155)
Child of household head (dummy) 0.601** 0.363* 1.174** 0.0859 0.624** 0.310** 0.636**
(0.125) (0.143) (0.124) (0.0820) (0.174) (0.113) (0.127)
Muslim (dummy) –0.134 –0.273 –0.0550 –0.483**
(0.129) (0.177) (0.193) (0.105)
Muslim × child of household head (dummy) –0.299 0.237 –0.494 0.185
(0.201) (0.301) (0.303) (0.167)
Male-headed household (dummy) 0.0240 0.232 –0.0859 –0.206 –0.251 0.0579 0.832**
(0.179) (0.346) (0.231) (0.182) (0.231) (0.296) (0.216)
Single-headed household (dummy) 0.238 0.381 0.370 0.162 0.0763 0.0840 0.702**
(0.156) (0.338) (0.228) (0.187) (0.230) (0.298) (0.215)
Education of household head 0.0208 0.0466** 0.00895 0.0476** 0.0309 0.0518** 0.0280*
(0.0143) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0103) (0.0168) (0.0116) (0.0139)
Education of spouse of household head 0.0274 0.0149 0.0156 0.0483** 0.0279 0.0199 –0.0106
(0.0191) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0140) (0.0233) (0.0142) (0.0157)
Education of household head × boy 0.0481* 0.0272 0.0441* 0.00471 0.00380 0.00191 0.0515*
(0.0245) (0.0200) (0.0217) (0.0136) (0.0318) (0.0160) (0.0232)
Education of spouse × boy –0.0624* 0.00379 0.0349 –0.0153 0.0315 0.0336 0.0178
(0.0311) (0.0259) (0.0307) (0.0193) (0.0479) (0.0218) (0.0258)
Self-employment of household head (dummy) –0.190 –0.244* –0.232* –0.298** –0.287* –0.213** –0.0322
(0.102) (0.0974) (0.106) (0.0720) (0.119) (0.0816) (0.0873)
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Number of adults in household 0.0344 0.0610** –0.0152 –0.00742 0.0528 –0.00297 0.0184
(0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0260) (0.0110) (0.0283) (0.0147) (0.0200)
Number of children in household 0.0283 –0.0545* –0.0142 –0.0242 –0.0133 –0.0136 –0.0382
(0.0274) (0.0218) (0.0259) (0.0141) (0.0385) (0.0156) (0.0203)
Internal migrant (dummy) –0.787** –0.831** –0.809** –0.638** –0.590** –0.675** –0.314*
(0.137) (0.185) (0.150) (0.143) (0.176) (0.196) (0.158)
Migrant × child of household head 0.746** 0.469* 0.566** 0.537** 0.736** 0.568* 0.699**
(0.203) (0.235) (0.210) (0.207) (0.244) (0.228) (0.212)
Wealth index 0.155** 0.0241 0.0972** 0.114** –0.00642 0.0820* 0.0316
(0.0285) (0.0320) (0.0302) (0.0195) (0.0327) (0.0328) (0.0255)
Intercept 1.295** 0.894 2.238** 2.070** 1.638** 1.999** 1.718**
(0.431) (0.536) (0.515) (0.324) (0.582) (0.449) (0.447)
Participates in domestic tasks
Age 0.0989** 0.0848** 0.0811** 0.137** –0.0312 0.0545* 0.0801**
(0.0284) (0.0237) (0.0257) (0.0197) (0.0325) (0.0218) (0.0225)
Boy (dummy) –0.762** –1.106** –0.598** –1.266** –0.852** –1.065** –0.949**
(0.186) (0.101) (0.138) (0.0802) (0.194) (0.0839) (0.125)
Child of household head (dummy) –0.392** –0.171 –0.219 –0.150 –0.144 –0.0561 –0.144
(0.126) (0.136) (0.126) (0.0789) (0.153) (0.117) (0.123)
Muslim (dummy) 0.155 –0.577** 0.0817 0.0747
(0.140) (0.164) (0.298) (0.0953)
Muslim × child of household head (dummy) –0.617** 0.609** –0.0829 –0.153
(0.205) (0.228) (0.368) (0.139)
Male-headed household (dummy) –0.218 0.105 0.125 –0.0600 –0.0243 0.374 0.370
(0.175) (0.317) (0.172) (0.138) (0.226) (0.253) (0.219)
Single-headed household (dummy) –0.268 –0.110 –0.117 –0.126 –0.276 0.302 0.241
(0.162) (0.309) (0.173) (0.138) (0.233) (0.250) (0.219)
(continued next page)
364
Education of household head –0.0190 0.0123 –0.0112 –0.0105 –0.0325 –0.00486 –0.0171
(0.0147) (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.00972) (0.0193) (0.0109) (0.0128)
Education of spouse of household head –0.0242 –0.0328* –0.0134 –0.0197 –0.0511* –0.0117 0.00592
(0.0196) (0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0129) (0.0260) (0.0139) (0.0148)
Education of household head × boy –0.00487 –0.0152 –0.00234 0.0208 0.0275 0.0110 0.0235
(0.0209) (0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0131) (0.0244) (0.0152) (0.0157)
Education of spouse × boy 0.0297 0.0371 0.0302 0.0364* 0.0266 –0.0201 –0.0278
(0.0268) (0.0197) (0.0209) (0.0180) (0.0313) (0.0225) (0.0199)
Self-employment of household head (dummy) –0.132 –0.131 0.172 0.152* 0.0550 0.132 0.00493
(0.115) (0.0897) (0.0986) (0.0747) (0.117) (0.0814) (0.0836)
Number of adults in household –0.0327 –0.0367* –0.0586* –0.0227* –0.0115 –0.0152 –0.0107
(0.0223) (0.0156) (0.0238) (0.0110) (0.0260) (0.0156) (0.0174)
Number of children in household –0.0613 0.0286 –0.0389 –0.00119 0.0205 0.00199 –0.0516**
(0.0327) (0.0193) (0.0256) (0.0136) (0.0334) (0.0177) (0.0199)
Internal migrant (dummy) 0.251 0.0961 0.133 –0.00141 0.508* 0.300 0.389*
(0.141) (0.176) (0.168) (0.149) (0.199) (0.193) (0.160)
Migrant × child of household head –0.309 –0.105 –0.0390 0.0579 –0.0568 –0.130 –0.198
(0.194) (0.220) (0.209) (0.204) (0.235) (0.225) (0.191)
Wealth index –0.0748* –0.0346 –0.0313 –0.0249 0.00148 –0.0493 –0.0309
(0.0311) (0.0277) (0.0287) (0.0204) (0.0344) (0.0296) (0.0232)
Intercept –0.185 –0.743 0.307 –1.104** 2.156** –0.610 –0.810*
(0.441) (0.483) (0.412) (0.295) (0.567) (0.396) (0.408)
Participates in market activities
Age 0.126** 0.199** 0.208** 0.247** 0.0917** 0.0848** 0.174**
(0.0399) (0.0356) (0.0348) (0.0307) (0.0341) (0.0269) (0.0317)
Boy (dummy) –0.364 0.213 –0.0358 0.369** –0.451** 0.237* 0.0394
(0.218) (0.112) (0.175) (0.110) (0.170) (0.0972) (0.203)
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Child of household head (dummy) –0.348* –0.0442 –1.145** 0.000821 –0.327* –0.216 –0.612**
(0.165) (0.153) (0.133) (0.110) (0.160) (0.143) (0.146)
Muslim (dummy) –0.0873 0.270 –0.305 0.382*
(0.153) (0.175) (0.200) (0.152)
Muslim × child of household head (dummy) 0.320 –0.399 0.126 –0.0761
(0.239) (0.353) (0.294) (0.215)
Male-headed household (dummy) –0.166 –0.236 0.263 0.260 0.356 0.157 –0.416
(0.196) (0.406) (0.231) (0.172) (0.202) (0.269) (0.301)
Single-headed household (dummy) –0.201 0.0699 –0.169 –0.00493 0.239 0.238 –0.190
(0.173) (0.400) (0.247) (0.176) (0.209) (0.259) (0.293)
Education of household head –0.0257 –0.00460 –0.0128 –0.0200 –0.0188 0.00319 –0.0295
(0.0181) (0.0134) (0.0152) (0.0144) (0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0192)
Education of spouse of household head 0.0125 0.00876 –0.0285 –0.0423* –0.00510 –0.0433* 0.0262
(0.0200) (0.0170) (0.0186) (0.0214) (0.0242) (0.0183) (0.0216)
Education of household head × boy –0.0498 –0.0316 –0.0760** –0.0361 0.00239 –0.0389 –0.00870
(0.0277) (0.0171) (0.0276) (0.0202) (0.0252) (0.0199) (0.0256)
Education of spouse × boy 0.0320 –0.0415 –0.00248 0.0358 –0.00833 0.0510* –0.0205
(0.0301) (0.0223) (0.0389) (0.0276) (0.0339) (0.0236) (0.0285)
Self-employment of household head (dummy) 0.322* 0.171 0.284* 0.237* 0.279* 0.330** 0.0803
(0.130) (0.110) (0.117) (0.0934) (0.112) (0.0996) (0.111)
Number of adults in household –0.0522 –0.0185 0.0172 0.00425 0.0406 –0.0249 –0.0456
(0.0308) (0.0196) (0.0264) (0.0150) (0.0237) (0.0189) (0.0236)
Number of children in household –0.0126 0.0183 0.0202 0.0176 –0.0304 –0.00986 0.0560
(0.0353) (0.0216) (0.0300) (0.0168) (0.0332) (0.0230) (0.0319)
Internal migrant (dummy) 0.635** 0.626** 0.588** 0.703** 0.556** 0.577** –0.0511
(0.171) (0.185) (0.149) (0.173) (0.173) (0.210) (0.180)
Migrant × child of household head –0.718** –0.507* –0.562* –0.738** –0.476* –0.291 –0.465
(0.256) (0.250) (0.220) (0.266) (0.218) (0.255) (0.269)
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Wealth index 0.00113 –0.0128 –0.0389 –0.0866** –0.0767* –0.0394 –0.0324
(0.0354) (0.0329) (0.0314) (0.0269) (0.0342) (0.0395) (0.0328)
Intercept –1.959** –3.558** –3.173** –4.964** –2.313** –2.315** –2.875**
(0.604) (0.671) (0.567) (0.454) (0.524) (0.459) (0.543)
r DS –0.389** –0.0749 –0.0618 –0.0968* –0.165 –0.156** –0.0934
(0.0636) (0.0535) (0.0630) (0.0417) (0.0932) (0.0482) (0.0506)
r LS –1.189** –0.389** –1.866** –0.671** –0.766** –0.411** –0.759**
(0.108) (0.0650) (0.148) (0.0646) (0.0850) (0.0655) (0.0789)
r LD 0.0746 0.231** 0.101 –0.0293 0.362** 0.222** 0.0524
(0.0744) (0.0612) (0.0696) (0.0563) (0.0774) (0.0479) (0.0506)
Number of observations 1,168 1,526 1,327 2,367 1,130 1,820 1,744
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected WAEMU countries 2001/02.
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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varied: boys are less likely to engage in an activity outside the home environ-
ment in Lomé but more likely to do so in Dakar and Niamey. Th e nature of 
the child’s relationship to the household head is an important determinant of 
allocation of time between work and school. Biological children of the house-
hold head have a higher probability of going to school and a lower probability 
of working (at home or in the market) than other children.5 Children who were 
not born in the capital have a signifi cantly lower probability of going to school 
and a higher probability of working in all cities except Ouagadougou.6 Th is 
result is true only for children who do not reside with their biological par-
ents, however, as the migratory status variable’s interaction with the children of 
household head dummy is always signifi cantly positive. Th is fi nding suggests 
that children who migrated to the capital and whose biological parents are likely 
to live elsewhere are more likely to work than to go to school. 
One possible explanation of these results is that migration status may aff ect 
the probability of working or attending school because migration and the 
choice of activity are part of the same project. Children who migrated with 
their parents may be more likely to go to school because one of the reasons for 
migrating was to enhance the possibilities of getting the children educated.7 
Children who migrated without their parents may have moved in order to 
fi nd work.
Many nonbiological children, particularly children born outside the capital, 
are likely to have been fostered to an adult member of the household. In Sen-
egal, for instance, about 12 percent of children 15 and younger are fostered, 
and 32 percent of households host or send one or more fostered children (Beck 
and others 2011). Th e fact that these children have a lower probability of going 
to school than the biological children of their hosting household is consistent 
with the hypothesis, popular among some international organizations and sup-
ported by some academic works, that fostering may have a negative impact on 
children’s well-being (Kielland 1999; UNICEF 1999; Case, Lin, and McLanahan 
2000; Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger 2004; Bishai and others 2003). Early stud-
ies on child fostering, such as the study by Ainsworth (1996), fi nd evidence that 
does not contradict this hypothesis, but these studies are limited by the nature 
of the data, which do not allow comparison of fostered children with children 
in their household of origin. 
Using data that match the origin and hosting households of fostered chil-
dren in Burkina Faso, Akresh (2008) shows that fostered children do not have 
a lower probability of going to school than the biological children of their host-
ing household and that this probability is signifi cantly higher than that of their 
nonfostered siblings. Using 2006/07 data from Senegal, Coppoletta and others 
(2011) show that adults who were fostered when young have slightly higher 
levels of education and better positions in their households than adults who had 
not been fostered. Hence, in the absence of other evidence, we cannot interpret 
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our results as fi rm evidence that fostered children are disadvantaged compared 
with their biological siblings.
A number of household characteristics also infl uence the time allocation 
decisions made for children. Having an educated head of household—and, 
to a lesser extent, spouse—raises the probability of a child going to school 
in most cities and reduces the probability of the child working. Th is fi nd-
ing is consistent with what is generally found in the literature: the presence 
of educated adults in a household raises children’s returns to education by 
providing fertile ground for learning and encouraging them to spend more 
time in school and less time working. Th e impact of the level of education of 
the household head is particularly strong among boys in Abidjan, Cotonou, 
and Ouagadougou. 
Th e level of education of the spouse of the household head is less signifi cant, 
because it encompasses two opposite eff ects. On the one hand, an educated 
woman has more employment opportunities and is therefore more likely to del-
egate domestic work to children in her household, which reduces their chances 
of going to school (however, results from chapter 7 show that the number of 
hours of domestic work does not decline when women work for income). On 
the other hand, an educated women is in a better position to support the chil-
dren in her household in their school education and therefore to send them to 
school rather than work.
Th e eff ect of the number of adults in the household on children’s schedules 
is signifi cant in only a few cities. In Bamako and, to a lesser extent, Abidjan and 
Lomé, the presence of more adults increases the probability of going to school; 
it reduces participation in domestic activities in most cities. Th ese results sug-
gest a distribution of tasks among diff erent household members. Children in 
the same household appear to compete with one another to go to school, as an 
increase in the number of children tends to reduce school attendance. However, 
the impact is not statistically strong or signifi cant, except in Bamako. 
Self-employment by the head of household and the household wealth indi-
cator have strong eff ects on children’s allocation of time. Living in a household 
whose head is a self-employed entrepreneur signifi cantly raises children’s par-
ticipation in economic activities in fi ve of the seven cities (all except Bamako 
and Ouagadougou), at the expense of schooling. One could argue that the deci-
sion of the household to start a business depends on whether there are young 
children able to help out. If this is the case, entrepreneurship is jointly deter-
mined with child work. 
Th is fi nding can be interpreted in two other ways. First, labor market 
imperfections may make it diffi  cult to hire external labor. A household head 
could consequently be driven to rely on family members, especially children. 
Th is interpretation mirrors in an urban setting the fi nding of Bhalotra and 
Heady (2003) in rural Ghana and Pakistan. 
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Second, work experience gained by children in the family business could 
enhance their employability, encouraging them to opt out of school. Household 
heads using the labor of their children (or other children in the household) 
could well be equipping them with skills or specifi c human capital they can 
then sell on the labor market. Th is interpretation echoes the hypothesis that 
children’s professional experience gained in the fi rst period raises their labor 
productivity in the second period.
As many empirical studies show (see, in particular, Psacharopoulos 1997; 
Ray 1999, 2000; Lachaud 2004), household wealth is an important determi-
nant of the time allocation decisions made for children. It has a positive and 
signifi cant eff ect on school attendance among children in four of the seven cit-
ies (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Niamey), where it reduces their participa-
tion in work (economic or domestic) activities. Th is eff ect is to be expected 
where access to the fi nancial market depends on the level of household wealth. 
Higher wealth allows households to relax the budgetary constraint, favoring 
school enrollment. Given that the wealth variable is not instrumented, one can-
not exclude the risk of an upward bias for the wealth coeffi  cient estimate in the 
schooling equation and downward bias in the labor market participation equa-
tion. However, given that the education levels of the household head and spouse 
are included in the equations and qualitatively identical results were obtained 
in fi ve of seven cities (all but Bamako and Ouagadougou), a true wealth eff ect 
appears to be at work, at least in some cities.
Conclusion
Th e chapter examines some of the factors infl uencing the allocation of children’s 
time in seven West African cities. It fi nds that both domestic and economic 
activities compete with school, but many children combine school with domes-
tic activities. Marked diff erences are evident between boys and girls, biological 
and nonbiological children, and migrant and nonmigrant children, with boys, 
biological children, and nonmigrant children having a higher propensity for 
going to school and a lower propensity for participating in domestic tasks and 
(for all groups but boys) economic activities. Th e propensity to attend school 
(work) is generally signifi cantly higher (lower) in more educated and wealthier 
households and households in which the household head is not a self-employed 
entrepreneur. 
Th is last fi nding points to a potential drawback of the standard recommen-
dation of providing credit and other asset-building mechanisms to poor house-
holds. To the extent that these mechanisms allow parents to operate their own 
business, they could actually increase child labor (Del Carpio and Loayza 2012 
for Nicaragua and Hazarika and Sarandi 2008 for rural Malawi fi nd results that 
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confi rm this intuition). Th is negative impact on school attendance may be miti-
gated if children learn specifi c skills that allow them to increase their resources 
in adulthood by more than the forgone earnings attributable to reduced school-
ing. Th e data suggest that boys seem to have privileged access to this alternative 
way of accumulating human capital. If further investigations confi rm this result, 
it would mean that gender inequality in access to education is coupled with 
inequality in access to on-the-job training in West African countries.
Notes
 1. Th e ILO defi nition of child labor is rather restrictive. It includes work that is “men-
tally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children; and inter-
feres with their schooling by: depriving them of the opportunity to attend school; 
obliging them to leave school prematurely; or requiring them to attempt to combine 
school attendance with excessively long and heavy work” (ILO 2012). According to 
this defi nition, a child who is prevented from attending school because of involve-
ment in family activities is not considered at work as long as these activities are not 
dangerous or harmful.
 2. Th e age of the end of compulsory schooling varies across countries (11 in Benin; 
12 in Niger and Senegal; 15 in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Togo; 16 in Burkina Faso). It 
is not clear whether this age is relevant, however, as it is not rigorously enforced. As 
is usual in the literature, we thus chose to focus on children ages 10–14.
 3. Dakar, where 52 percent of working children are apprentices, is the exception. 
Apprentices are also important in Cotonou (32 percent), Ouagadougou (26 percent), 
Abidjan (25 percent), and Bamako (24 percent). Apprentices are generally not paid, 
but they learn to become welders, mechanics, tailors, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, and 
restaurant servers.
 4. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 5. Children with the status of domestic staff  were excluded from the sample to avoid 
biasing the results.
 6. A large proportion of children in some cities (37 percent in Lomé, 31 percent in 
Abidjan, 27 percent in Cotonou, and 23 percent in Ouagadougou) were born outside 
the capital. Th is proportion is lower in Bamako (17 percent), Niamey (15 percent), 
and Dakar (9 percent).
 7. It could also be the case that these children share with their parents common unob-
served characteristics that increase both the probability of migration and the prob-
ability of attending school. Our data do not allow us to test this possibility.
References
Ainsworth, M. 1996. “Economic Aspects of Child Fostering in Cote d’Ivoire.” In Research 
in Population Economics, vol. 8, ed. T. P. Schultz, 25–62. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Akresh, R. 2008 “School Enrollment Impacts of Non-traditional Household Structure.” 
BREAD Working Paper 89, Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Develop-
ment, Durham, NC.
THE WORK-SCHOOL TRADE-OFF AMONG CHILDREN IN WEST AFRICA  371
Baland, J. M., and J. A. Robinson. 2000. “Is Child Labor Effi  cient?” Journal of Political 
Economy 108 (4): 663–79.
Basu, K., and P. Van. 1998. “Th e Economics of Child Labor.” American Economic Review 
88 (3): 412–27.
Beck, S., P. De Vreyer, S. Lambert, K. Marazyan, and A. Safi r. 2011. “Child Fostering in 
Senegal.” Paris School of Economics. http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/
lambert-sylvie/confi age7-1.pdf.
Becker, G. S. 1964. Human Capital. New York: Columbia University Press for the 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Becker, G. S., and H. Lewis. 1973. “On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality 
of Children.” Journal of Political Economy 81 (2): S279–88.
Behrman, J. R, R. Pollak, and P. Taubman. 1982. “Parental Preferences and Provision for 
Progeny.” Journal of Political Economy 90 (1): 52–73.
Bhalotra, S., and C. Heady. 2003. “Child Farm Labor: Th e Wealth Paradox.” World Bank 
Economic Review 17 (2): 197–227. 
Bishai, D., E. D. Suliman, H. Brahmbhatt, F. Wabwire-Mangen, G. Kigozi, N. 
Sewankambo, D. Serwadda, M. Wawer, and R. Gray. 2003. “Does Biological Related-
ness Aff ect Survival?” Demographic Research 8 (9): 262–77.
Case, A., I.-F. Lin, and S. McLanahan 2000. “How Hungry Is the Selfi sh Gene?” Economic 
Journal 10 (466): 781–804.
Case, A., C. Paxson, and J. Ableidinger. 2004. “Orphans in Africa: Parental Death, Pov-
erty, and School Enrollment.” Demography 41 (3): 483–508.
Coppoletta, R., P. De Vreyer, S. Lambert, and A. Safi r. 2011. “Th e Long Term Impact 
of Child Fostering in Senegal: Adults Fostered in their Childhood.” Paris School 
of Economics. http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/lambert-sylvie/lotif_
ver22.pdf.
De Vreyer, P., S. Lambert, and T. Magnac. 1999. “Educating Children: A Look at House-
hold Behaviour in Côte d’Ivoire.” Document de travail, Centre d’Etude des Politiques 
Economiques de l’Université d’Evry (EPEE) 99-13, Evry, France.
Del Carpio, X. V., and N. V. Loayza. 2012. “Th e Impact of Wealth on the Amount 
and Quality of Child Labor.” Policy Research Working Paper 5959, World Bank, 
 Washington, DC.
Dumas, C. 2004. “Impact de la structure familiale sur les décisions parentales de mise au 
travail des enfants: le cas du Brésil.” Revue d’Economie du Développement 18 (1): 71–99.
Greene, W. H. 2003. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. New York: Prentice Hall.
Hazarika, G., and S. Sarangi. 2008. “Household Access to Microcredit and Child Work 
in Rural Malawi.” World Development 36 (5): 843–59. 
ILO (International Labour Organization). 2012. “What Is Child Labour?” http://www
.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang--en/index.htm.
Jacoby, H., and E. Skoufi as. 1997. “Risk, Financial Markets and Human Capital in a 
Developing Country.” Review of Economic Studies 64: 311–35.
Kielland, A. 1999. “Children’s Work in Benin: Estimating the Magnitude of Exploitative 
Child Placement.” World Bank, Social Protection Sector, Washington, DC.
372  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Kis-Katos, K. 2012. “Gender Diff erences in Work-Schooling Decisions in Rural North 
India.” Review of Economics of the Household. doi:10.1007/s11150–012–9153–x.
Lachaud, J.-P. 2004. “Le travail des enfants et la pauvreté en Afrique: un réexamen appli-
qué au Burkina Faso.” Working Paper 96, Centre d’Economie du Développement, 
Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.
Psacharopoulos, G. 1997. “Child Labour Versus Educational Attainment: Some Evidence 
from Latin America.” Journal of Population Economics 10 (4): 377–86.
Ranjan, P. 1999. “An Economic Analysis of Child Labor.” Economics Letters 64 (1): 99–105.
Ray, R. 1999. “Th e Determinants of Child Labor and Child Schooling in Ghana.” Journal 
of African Economies 11 (4): 561–90.
———. 2000. “Child Labor, Child Schooling, and Th eir Interaction with Adult Labor: 
Empirical Evidence for Peru and Pakistan.” World Bank Economic Review 14 (2): 
347–67.
Rosenzweig, M., and K. Wolpin. 1985. “Specifi c Experience, Household Structure, and 
Intergenerational Transfers: Farm Family Land and Labor Arrangements in Develop-
ing Countries.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (5): 961–87. 
Skoufi as, E., and S. Parker. 2002. “A Cost-Eff ectiveness Analysis of Demand and 
Supply-Side Education Interventions.” FNCD Discussion Paper 227, International 
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Terracol, A. 2002. “Triprobit and the GHK Simulator: A Short Note.” Appendix to the 
Stata Triprobit command. http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/g/GHK_note.pdf.
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). 1999. “Child Domestic Work.” Innocenti 
Digest No. 5, International Child Development Center, Florence, Italy.

© 2013 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / Th e World Bank
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org
Some rights reserved
1 2 3 4  16 15 14 13
Th is work is a product of the staff  of Th e World Bank with external contributions. Note that Th e World 
Bank and the Agence Française de Développement do not necessarily own each component of the content 
included in the work. Th e World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement therefore do not 
warrant that the use of the content contained in the work will not infringe on the rights of third parties. 
Th e risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you.
Th e fi ndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily refl ect the 
views of Th e World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent, or the 
Agence Française de Développement. Th e World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data 
included in this work. Th e boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map 
in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of Th e World Bank concerning the legal status of any 
territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and 
immunities of Th e World Bank, all of which are specifi cally reserved.
Rights and Permissions
Th is work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0) http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license, you are free to 
copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, including for commercial purposes, under the following 
conditions:
Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: De Vreyer, Philippe, and François Roubaud, Editors. 2013. 
Urban Labor Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa Development Forum series. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-9781-7. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0
Translations—If you create a translation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the 
attribution: Th is translation was not created by Th e World Bank and should not be considered an offi  cial 
World Bank translation. Th e World Bank shall not be liable for any content or error in this translation.
All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the Offi  ce of the Publisher, Th e World Bank, 
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org.
ISBN (paper): 978-0-8213-9781-7
ISBN (electronic): 978-0-8213-9782-4
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9781-7
Cover image: ©Michelle Saint-Léger, IRD, 2013. 
Cover design: Debra Naylor, Naylor Design, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Vreyer, Philippe De.
 Urban labor markets in sub-Saharan Africa/Philippe De Vreyer and François Roubaud.
  p. cm.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN 978-0-8213-9781-7 — ISBN 978-0-8213-9782-4 (electronic)
 1. Labor market—Africa, Sub-Saharan. 2. Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions. 3. City 
dwellers—Employment—Africa, Sub-Saharan. I. Roubaud, François. II. World Bank. III. Title. 
 HD5837.A6V74 2013
 331.120967—dc23
 2012050217
Th e French translation of this book is copublished by Agence Française de Développement and Institut 
de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD). Th e IRD, a French public research institute emphasizing 
interdisciplinarity, has focused its research for more than 65 years on the relationship between man and 
its environment in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean, and the French tropical overseas ter-
ritories. Its research, training, and innovation activities are intended to contribute to the social, economic, 
and cultural development of southern countries. For further information: www.editions.ird.fr.
